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Abstract—Research on sensor networks has become much more 
active and is currently being applied to many different fields. 
However since sensor networks are limited to only collecting and 
reporting information regarding a certain event, and requires 
human intervention with that given information, it is often 
difficult to react to an event or situation immediately and 
proactively. To overcome this kind of limitation, Wireless Sensor 
and Actor Networks (WSANs) with immediate-response actor 
nodes have been proposed which adds greater mobility and 
activity to the existing sensor networks. Although WSANs share 
many common grounds with sensor networks, it is difficult to 
apply existing security technologies due to the fact that WSANs 
contain actor nodes that are resource-independent and mobile. 
Therefore, this research seeks to demonstrate ways to provide 
security, integrity, and authentication services for WSAN's 
secure operation, by separating networks into hierarchical 
structure by each node's abilities and provides different 
encryption key-based secure protocols for each level of 
hierarchy: Pair-wise key, node key, and region key for sensor 
levels, and public key for actor 
Keywords ; Wireless Sensor and Actor Network(WSAN), Key 
management Protocol 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Sensor networks, which have gained interests with the 
advancement of wireless communication technologies and 
embedded computing, are being widely adapted into many 
applications and many active researches on related subject are 
being carried out. A sensor network utilizes multitudes of 
sensor nodes within or neighboring the area of event to collect 
integrate, process, and relay the information regarding the 
event through sink node. Due to this inherent structure, this 
system requires additional special efforts in order to enable 
immediate and on-time response to the events based on those 
processed information.  
WSANs(Wireless Sensor and Actor Networks) are proposed 
to overcome the limitations of traditional sensor networks. It 
includes mobile and resource-efficient actors within the 
network and enables these actors to respond appropriately 
based on the information collected by sensor nodes. This is in 
fact a very useful and applicable type of network that can be 
used in applications such as Forrest-fire monitoring, home 
intrusion prevention or military surveillance and operations 
[1]. 
WSANs share many similarities with sensor networks as 
they are networks without infrastructure and they use wireless 
communication technologies. Therefore WSANs require many 
existing applied technologies in their deployment. Unlike 
traditional sensor networks whose nodes share the same 
authority and power, actor-based WSANs require a different 
approach in implementing these technologies. Especially, 
WSN only consists of sensor nodes which are resource 
dependent. And the network structure of WSNs is very simple. 
Considering both the resource limitation of sensor nodes and 
the structural simplicity of WSNs, most key management 
protocols have researched by symmetric encryption approach. 
But WSANs have not only sensor nodes but also actor nodes 
which are resource independent. Thus, the structural feature of 
WSANs has to be considered. Due to the facts, existing 
protocols for the WSNs are not suitable for WSANs. 
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new efficient key 
management protocol for the WSAN. The major contributions 
are summarized as follows:   
a) Our proposed protocol splits the WSAN into two 
layers, the upper (sink-actor) layer and the lower (actor-
sensor) layer. In the lower layer, we use symmetric approach 
by adopting the key management concept of the LEAP. But, 
especially to achieve the energy efficiency, we reduce the 
number of the key and simplify the procedure of the key 
establishment, and then reduce the amount of memory 
required and communication cost comparing with LEAP. In 
the upper layer, we use asymmetric encryption mechanism to 
provide the high degree of security.  
b) When replacing the existing actor node with the new 
actor node, it is not efficient that again establish the node key 
and region key between the new actor node and sensor nodes. 
So we employ the binding table in the actor and sink node.  
This paper examines the communication structure and 
security requirement for WSANs, and proposes a new efficient 
key-management protocol to ensure security in routing, 
transmission, and authentication of data. Performance analysis 
of the proposed protocol will follow and demonstrate its 
security and efficiency. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 summarizes previous researches. Section 3 draws the 
security requirements through network structure analysis. 
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Section 4 proposes an efficient key-management protocol for 
WSANs. Section 5 analyzes the security of our scheme. 
Section 6 analyzes the performance of proposed protocol. 
Finally, section 7 will find a summary and conclusion of all 
above sections. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
The objective of security in a sensor network is to ensure 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and availability using 
the existing network capabilities. To achieve this objective the 
researches on sensor network security have been occurring in 
three major branches: first the sensor network security service 
structure approach, offers authentication through a Trustee 
relationship suitable for sensor networks [2][3][4]; second the 
key management approach based on a random subset key pre-
distribution from a large key pool[5][6][7][8][9][10][11]; third 
asymmetric cryptography approach[12][13]. 
Perrig et al. proposed SPINS, a security architecture 
specifically designed for sensor networks [2]. The structures 
of SPINS are comprised of SNEP (Secure Network Encryption 
Protocol) which offers data security, authentication, and 
resetting keys to prevent repeated attacks. The u-TESLA 
Scheme provides authentication for broadcasted data. This 
method requires all sensor nodes to pass through the base 
station for security keys, resulting in heavy traffic overhead 
and extended delays when there are too many nodes to 
authenticate. It also requires all nodes to synchronize its time 
to work properly. S. Zhu et al. proposed LEAP (Localized 
Encryption and Authentication Protocol) which can overcome 
eavesdropping of data and limitations on resources and 
computing power of sensor nodes through encryption and 
source authentication [3]. Unlike previous single-key methods, 
LEAP uses 4 different types of keys that are used for each 
different type of messages being transmitted. The four keys 
are: Individual key shared by Base Station(BS) and all nodes, 
Pair-wise key shared by one neighboring node within one hop 
of a given node, Cluster key shared by all neighboring nodes 
within one hope of a given node, Group key shared by 
everyone in the network. Individual key and the group key are 
pre-saved before nodes are deployed, and u-TESLA scheme 
renews the group key within the predefined intervals. 
Assuming that the base station is safe, there is no need to 
consider the safety of this group key. The pair-wise key is 
generated based on the initial key. The cluster key is encrypted 
by this pair-wise key before getting transmitted.  
   Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a random key pre-
distribution scheme [5]: before deployment, each sensor node 
receives a random subset of keys from a large key pool. Based 
on the [5], Chan, Perring, and Song proposed a q-composite 
random key pre-distribution scheme [6]. The difference 
between this scheme and the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme is that 
q common keys, instead of just a single one, are needed to 
establish secure communications between a pair of node. It is 
shown that, by increasing the value of q, network resilience 
against node capture is improved, i.e., an attacker has to 
compromise many more nodes to achieve a high probability of 
compromised communication. Du et al. proposed a new key 
pre-distribution scheme [7], which significantly improves the 
resilience of the network compared to the existing schemes. 
This scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the 
number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the 
probability that any nodes other than these compromised 
nodes are affected is close to zero. A random key pre-
distribution scheme that uses deployment knowledge was 
proposed by Du et al.[8] and Huang et al.[9] and Lee et 
al.[10]. Dai et al. recently proposed a new key pre-distribution 
scheme based on Rooted- Tree in WSAN [11]. The key 
management tree is constructed where sink is the root, actors 
are the branches and sensors are the leaves, to achieve the 
distributed and integrated key management. One drawback of 
this key management approach is that some wireless links may 
not be keyed and thus a node may need to use a multi-hop path 
to communicate with one of its neighbor nodes. Since each 
sensor node should generate and then store many keys to share 
with all its neighbors immediately after deployed, the 
communication and storage cost are generally huge. 
Several other methods based on asymmetric cryptography 
are also proposed: Zhou and Hass proposed a secure ad hoc 
network using secret sharing and threshold cryptography [12]. 
Kong et al. also propose localized public-key infrastructure 
mechanisms, based on secret sharing schemes [13]. 
Usually, asymmetric cryptography mechanisms ensure a 
powerful security in authentication. However, this mechanism 
requires more cost to authenticate between nodes, thus is 
suitable for nodes which have enough resource.  
 
III. NETWORK STRUCTURE AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
A. Network  structure 
The basic structure of WSANs is shown in figure 1. The 
main different between WSANs and an existing sensor 
network is that there are actor nodes in between sensor nodes 
and sink node. These actor nodes have larger capacity, more 
computing power, better communications ability, and stronger 
mobility. 
 
 
<Figure 1. Network structure of WSANs > 
 
Therefore WSANs plan and operate the network based on 
the different capabilities of the three different types of nodes 
within the network. Sensor networks are located in a 
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designated location and respond to the requests of actor nodes 
or sink node. Actor nodes send out queries to sensor nodes in 
the neighboring area then integrate the responses of sensors 
nodes and take the appropriate action when necessary. Finally, 
sink node work similar to actor nodes to control activities of 
sensors or actors when required. Sink node also plays a role of 
a gateway to an external network, allowing external task 
manager nodes to monitor and control the entire network.  
Communication between actors is possible either in single or 
multiple hops. For actor-sensor communications, actor can 
communicate in one hop with a sensor node within its area of 
responsibility while a sensor node requires setting up a 
multiple hop traffic path to an actor. Figure 3 shows the 
conceptual diagram of network communication in WSANs. 
Since actors in WSANs are mobile, the region each actor is 
responsible for may change at any time. When this occurs, 
actors can coordinate with each other to redistribute the area of 
responsibility. 
 
B. Security requirements 
By the nature of wireless communication, any data packets 
in WSANs may be exposed to attackers. Attackers may choose 
to threaten the confidentiality and integrity of packets using 
various methods and may even carry out attacks like DoS in 
order to destabilize the network.  
 
 
<Figure 2. Communication concept of WSANs> 
 
Exposure of sensitive information such as encryption keys 
and their destination to malicious attackers may threaten the 
entire network. Therefore, sensitive information must be kept 
secure using encryption. Packets must also be authenticated in 
order to prevent malicious codes from being injected into 
packets that are transmitted. A receiver must be able to 
determine whether the sender is a trustworthy source and also 
whether the original message sent by the sender is kept intact 
during its travel. Freshness of data must be kept as well in case 
of repeated attacks. Therefore, confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, and availability must be provided for all data 
transmitted within the network. 
IV. A KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL FOR WSAN 
A. Assumptions 
First, sensor nodes are limited in their storage capacity, 
computing power, and communication ability. They are 
distributed randomly and once deployed their positions are 
fixed. Actor nodes may move freely within their region of 
responsibility and can communicate within one hop to all 
nodes located in the region. They have enough storage 
capacity and computing power.  
Second, due to the weakness of wireless communication, all 
data packets may be exposed to an attacker. The proposed 
scheme has the powerful intrusion detection system to detect 
any malicious attacks from an attacker. Also we assume that 
both actor nodes and sink node will not be compromised. 
Third, all nodes are given an initial key and a certificate 
from a third party in order to create pair-wise keys and node 
keys. They also contain a very strong encryption algorithm. 
Finally, the time Texposure which is the duration of exposure 
of the key information of a node taken over by an attacker at 
the time of initial nodes distribution is always longer than the 
time Tdiscovery which is the duration of detection and key 
generation of neighboring node by a node. 
 
B. Overall setput and notations 
The approach this paper uses is based on the differentiated 
network structure of WSANs as shown in figure 3. Since the 
layer higher than actors has enough resources and computing 
power, we proposed an approach based on asymmetric 
encryption mechanism. For the layer lower than actors which 
has limitations in capacities and power, we proposed an 
approach using symmetric encryption. Each sensor and actor 
node has a unique id and maintains three key types based on 
LEAP scheme.  
 
 
<Figure 3. Hierarchical structure of WSANs> 
 
For lower layer below actors, the following key 
management structure comprised of three keys ensures 
security of messages transmitted from actors and reports 
produced by sensor nodes.  
 
Pair-wise key: This key is shared by sensor nodes within one 
hop neighbors, and used to ensure integrity of data when a 
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sensor node responds to a request by an actor. The actor is 
considered as a sensor when generating this key. 
 
Node key: This key is shared by each sensor node in a region 
with actor, and used for encrypting sensitive information being 
broadcasted to the network such as reports or key renewals. 
 
 Region key: This key is shared by sensor nodes within a 
region of responsibility of an actor, and used to encrypt and 
authenticate messages or commands broadcasted to sensors 
within a specific region managed by the actor.  
 
For the upper layer the security requirements are met using 
general public key structure appropriate for MANET. This 
public key system is used to ensure security between an actor 
and sinks. It includes private key, public key, and certification. 
 
Table 1 summarizes notations used in this paper. 
< Table 1. Notations> 
 
C. Key management for lower layer 
1) Establishing Pair-wise Keys 
In this scheme, the pair-wise key is targeted to the entire 
network and does not differentiate the type of nodes when 
establishing the key. 
 
Pre-distribution phase: The initial key KIP is generated and 
saved into memory. Each node then produces own master key 
using the pseudo-random number function out of the initial 
key. For example, the master key for the node Si is as follows:  
 
KSi = FKIP (IDSi) 
 
Discovery phase: After nodes are deployed, all nodes 
broadcast their ID and random number. Upon receiving this 
broadcast, neighboring nodes generate MAC using their own 
master key and send it back to the original node. Sources are 
authenticated by verifying the MAC received from 
neighboring nodes.  
 
Pair-wise key generation phase: After verifying the source, 
each pair of nodes generate same pair-wise key using pseudo-
random number function on the other’s ID. Pair-wise key for 
node S1 and S2 are generated as follows:   
KS1S2 = FKS2 (IDS1) 
 
Key deletion phase: Sensor nodes which finish the initial key 
setup completely delete all keys used in the process from the 
memory, except their own master key. 
 
Pair-wise key establishment is illustrated in figure 4.  
 
 
<Figure 4. Pair-wise key establishment> 
 
2) Establishing Node Key 
An actor broadcasts its presence and its ID to the region. 
Sensor nodes encrypt their own IDs using the previously 
distributed initial key (KIN ) and send it to the actor. The actor 
node then generates the node key using the ID of the sensor 
and randomized number, and sends it back to sensor nodes. 
After establishment, sensor nodes delete previously distributed 
key from its memory. The following figure 5 is the summary 
of the node key establishment procedure between a sensor 
node and an actor node. 
 
 
<Figure 5. Node key establishment> 
3) Establishing Binding Table 
Notation Description 
S(Sink) Sink node or Base Station 
A Actor node 
PKA,SKA, 
CERTA 
Public key, Secret key and Certification of actor A, 
respectively 
PKCA, SKCA Public and Secret key of Certification Authority 
S1, S2 … Si Sensor nodes 
M1 || M2 Append message M2 to message M1 
KIP, KIN Initial keys for pair-wise and node key generation 
Ek[msg] Encrypt msg using the key k 
Dk[msg] Decrypt msg using the key k 
f() Unidirectional hash function 
MAC(key,msg) Message authentication code generated by the key 
FK Pseudo-random number Function 
NS1 Random number generated by node S1 
KSi Master key for node Si 
KS1S2 Pair-wise key for nodes S1 and S2 
KNi Node key between actor A and node Si 
KRid Region key between actor A and regional sensor nodes Si 
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After establishing node key, an actor node keeps a binding 
table which saves all sensor node IDs within the region and 
their node keys. Actor nodes also keep their own binding 
tables on the binding tables of sink node. Figure 6 shows a 
sample binding table.  
 
 
<Figure 6. Example binding table> 
 
This not only allows convenient update for the binding table 
establishment of a new actor, as using the binding table of sink 
node without going through whole key generation procedures, 
but also relives energy consumption for energy-constrained 
sensor nodes. 
 
4) Establishing Region Key 
Actor nodes generate a random key KRid using random 
numbers. Rid signifies the identification of the region which 
the actor is responsible for. This region key is encrypted using 
node key KNi and distributed to each sensor node. The 
following figure 7 is the summary of region key establishment 
procedure between a sensor node and an actor node. 
 
 
<Figure 7. Region key establishment > 
 
The actor sets an expiration time during the region key 
generation, and when the key expires the actor broadcasts 
notifications to all sensor nodes within the region and 
redistributes a new region key.  
 
5) Adding Nodes 
The addition of new sensor nodes must be easy and fast in 
order to create large-scale WSANs. Additional sensor nodes 
are given initial keys of KIP and KIN before being deployed to 
generate pair-wise and node key, respectively. When a new 
sensor node is being added to the region, The task manager 
node must retransmit the initial key to the actor node for 
establishing the node key.  
Sensor nodes establish the node key using above-mentioned 
processes and delete the initial key when it is done. Then the 
region key is established when the actor notifies the timeouts 
and renewals of region key. 
 
6) Nodes Deletion and Key Renewal 
In the WSANs, since sensor nodes are mainly used in 
hostile environment, their function may be lost. If the sensor 
node is compromised by a malicious node, its keys can be 
exposed. This situation causes serious problem in the WSANs. 
So when the sensor node is compromised and then excluded in 
the network by any detection algorithm, we have to ensure the 
network security by renewing the keys. The proposed 
procedures in this paper are done in following steps. 
 
Phase A – Detection: Based on intrusion detection algorithm 
for wireless sensor networks detect and recognize the attack or 
loss of node by a malicious attacker. WSANs can use this to 
detect any anomalies within network and start to find a 
solution for it.  
 
Phase B – Removing pair-wise key: All nodes within one hop 
of the affected node remove their pair-wise key. Attacker is no 
longer able to use that key to continue further attacks to other 
parts of network. 
 
Phase C – Renewing region key: Actor node broadcasts the 
region key renewal message to all nodes within the region. 
The original region key no longer becomes valid and prevents 
the lost node from disguising itself as the actor node. The real 
actor node then removes the node key of lost node and updates 
the binding table. 
 
Phase D – Reset region key: Actor node recreates the region 
key and transmits the key to all effective nodes within the 
region by unicast, excluding the lost node. 
 
Figure 8 depicts the above procedure. 
 
 
<Figure 8. Procedure of key renewal> 
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D. Key management for upper layer 
The upper layer utilizes publicly available public key 
encryption method applied to MANET. In this proposed 
method the sink node plays a role of a Certification Authority. 
Key management and authentications are done in following 
steps: 
 
Pre-distribution of keys and certificates: Actor node A 
receives PKA, SKA, CERTA and PKCA from a trustworthy third-
party on offline source. In this process, the following equation 
is produced: 
 
CERTA = ESKCA [ A || PKA || Tsign || Texpire] 
  
Tsign is issuance time and Texpire is expiry time for the 
certificate. Each certificate has same expiry period. Sink node 
saves PKCA, SKCA, and CERTCA on the binding table, as well as 
each actor’s ID and their public keys.  
 
Destroying certificates: When a node becomes captured by 
an attacker or loses its function, the certificate for that node 
becomes no longer valid and it is saved onto Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) for records.  
 
Certificate authentication and session key generation: Two 
nodes in the upper layer (actor-actor or actor-sink) follow an 
authentication procedure as shown in figure 9. 
 
 
<Figure 9. Certificate authentication > 
 
After accomplishing the authentication procedure, each 
node obtains the public key of the other. Using this public key, 
the session key for the pair node is produced by following 
procedure as shown in figure 10 and used for one 
communication period. If the communication is complete, the 
session key is immediately deleted. 
 
Certificate renewal: The certificate renewal uses the 
predefined constant Trefresh. The renewal time, expiry time, and 
Trefresh have the following relationship. 
 
Trefresh ≤ (Texpire - Tsign) 
 
All certificate owners must renew their certificate within time 
Trefresh. 
 
 
<Figure 10. Session key establishment > 
 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme. As 
mentioned in Sec. 4.1, both actor nodes and sink node are will 
not be compromised. So we only analyze the security of our 
scheme in the lower layer. The proposed protocol in this paper 
is an ID-based scheme which authenticates all messages 
traversing; therefore an internal attacker is the only point to be 
considered. In case the compromised node modifies or cast 
away the packet, the next sensor node can detect this by 
overhearing the message sent out of the node. Most of the 
attacks fall into one of following categories: spoofed, altered, 
or relayed routing information, sinkhole, wormhole, Sybil, 
HELLO flood attacks. We discuss how our scheme can defend 
against those. 
 
• Spoofing, altering, or replaying routing information: 
We assume that our scheme has the powerful intrusion 
detection system. Once the compromised node is 
detected somehow, our nodes deletion and key renewal 
scheme [see section 4.3.6] can efficiently eliminate that 
node from joining routing process.  
• Wormhole and sinkhole attacks: An insider adversary 
simultaneously needs to compromise at least two 
sensor nodes to create a wormhole. But our scheme can 
enough easily detect the compromised node by using 
the intrusion detection system. Thus it is difficult for 
the adversary to create a wormhole without being 
detected. In a sinkhole attack, a compromised node 
may try to attract packets from its neighbors and then 
drop them, by advertising information such as high 
remaining energy. But neighbor nodes can   detect this 
by overhearing the node. If malicious actions are 
detected, our nodes deletion and key renewal scheme 
can efficiently defend.  
• Sybil attacks: In the key establishment phase, MAC 
and random number are used to authenticate between 
the sender and the receiver. Therefore, a node cannot 
pretend to be another node. As a consequence, Sybil 
attack would not work. 
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• HELLO flood attacks: The attacker may try to launch a 
HELLO Flood Attack in which it sends a HELLO 
message to all the nodes. However, this attack will not 
succeed in our scheme because every sensor node only 
accepts packets from its authenticated neighbors. So 
our scheme can prevent HELLO flood attacks.  
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We evaluate the performance of our scheme by comparing 
with LEAP. The evaluation was carried out mathematical 
analysis. This paper ignores the computation load, storage 
requirements or communications cost for actor nodes and sink 
node since they already have enough capacity. Thus, 
considering only the sensor nodes, which has limited amount 
of capabilities, same performance analysis as LEAP can be 
applied to determine the communication and computational 
cost. Sensor nodes generally communicate with neighbors 
within one hop to generate and transmit keys. The costs are 
thus determined by the density of nodes, not the size of 
network. 
The computational cost in the proposed method can be 
obtained by the number of messages get encrypted or 
decrypted. That is, a sensor node performs one hash 
computation to create a master key from a initial key, and 
costs are incurred when encrypting messages using the master 
key and also while generating pair-wise keys. In a network of 
size N where every node has a connection degree d, the 
computational cost can be obtained by the following equation.  
 
(2d+1)N + 4N + 2N (Eq. 1) 
 
In Equation 1, (2d+1)N is the computational cost for 
generating pair-wise keys of the entire nodes. 4N is the cost 
for node keys and 2N is for the region keys. If network size is 
fixed, the computational cost is dependent on the density of 
nodes and complexity becomes O(d). When comparing the 
proposed method to LEAP [3] in computational costs, it can 
be demonstrated that this method is more efficient since the 
complexity of LEAP becomes O(d2) when network size is 
fixed like above assumption. Figure 11 shows the graphical 
representation of computation complexity of LEAP and 
proposed method. 
 
 
<Figure 11. Comparison of computation complexity> 
The communication cost is the sum of all costs incurred 
during transmission and reception of the messages while each 
node generates appropriate keys such as pair-wise keys, node 
keys, and region key. While generating pair-wise keys, each 
sensor nodes incur one unit of communication cost to 
broadcast its existence to neighbors, and another unit is spent 
by the neighboring node for response. Node key requires 3 
units, and region key requires 2 units. Therefore, the total sum 
of cost in this proposed protocol is as follows:  
 
2dN + 3N + 2N (Eq. 2) 
 
When considering only the lower layer, a sensor node which 
has D neighbors needs to store one node key, D pair-wise 
keys, and one region key. Therefore, the storage requirement 
for this lower layer is D + 2. 
The efficiency of storage requirement for the proposed 
protocol in this paper can be compared with that of LEAP 
which is a similar symmetric key based management structure. 
LEAP requires a space of 3D + 2 + L, where L is key chain 
storage area for authentication containing a predefined 
constant value. Thus without L, the storage requirement 
comparison can be shown in graph as in figure 12. As the 
number of neighboring node increases the storage requirement 
for LEAP rises considerably while the proposed protocol only 
rises to one third of height.  
 
 
<Figure 12. Comparison of storage requirement> 
 
This storage requirement is indeed an acceptable level 
considering products like Mica2 or MicaZ designed by 
Crossbow, one of the most popular sensor nodes, have 4KB of 
memory space available. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This paper proposed a new efficient key management 
protocol for WSANs. The application of security is done in 
layers or hierarchical method. The upper layer which has less 
resource limitation is proposed to use security scheme based 
on the Public Key algorithm, while lower layer with high 
resource limitation uses scheme based on the Symmetric Key 
algorithm – namely pair-wise, node, and region keys.  
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Appropriate and efficient key structure for WSANs has 
been defined, detailed explanations of how each key is 
generated, and applied. Our method of key management can 
be applied to sensor actor networks. 
Later researches will analyze more precisely the safety and 
effectiveness of this proposed method by using simulations. 
Also, distributed CA environment using methods such as 
Threshold Cryptography will be considered in case there is no 
sink node. 
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